The Trump Administration deports four immigrants to Eswatini in East Africa.
Key Takeaways
- Eswatini has accepted four more U.S.-deported immigrants under a $5.1 million agreement; the total sent there now stands at 19.
- The latest group reportedly includes two Somalis, one Sudanese, and one Tanzanian; their identities were not disclosed.
- A Human Rights First flight tracker allegedly confirmed the removal flight from Phoenix to Eswatini.
- A Democratic-led Senate inquiry says more than $40 million has been paid to five foreign governments to take third-country deportees.
- Advocates warn third-country deportations risk abuse and “chain refoulement,” while legal avenues to contest removal remain narrow and fast-moving.
What happened
Eswatini, a small nation in southern Africa, has confirmed it received four immigrants deported by the United States under a multimillion-dollar agreement with the Trump Administration. The arrivals bring the total number of U.S.-removed foreign nationals accepted by Eswatini to 19. According to local authorities, the latest group includes two citizens of Somalia, one of Sudan, and one of Tanzania. It has been reported that a flight tracker run by Human Rights First verified a removal flight that departed Phoenix, Arizona, and landed in Eswatini late Wednesday.
Financial details are drawing scrutiny. El País reports the United States paid Eswatini $5.1 million for the arrangement, part of a broader network of deals to send non-nationals to third countries. A Democratic staff investigation on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee alleges the Administration has disbursed more than $40 million to five governments, calling the program “ineffective and cruel,” and asserting payments have gone to “corrupt and unstable” regimes with records of human rights abuses. Operating costs are steep: flight time alone can run about $32,000 per hour, with average per-person removal costs around $130,000 and, in some cases, reportedly up to $1 million.
How this fits in U.S. removal law
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA §241), ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) can remove someone with a final order to their country of nationality, last residence, or—if those options fail—“another country” willing to accept them. That’s distinct from “safe third country” asylum transfers, which govern where asylum claims are processed. The current policy leverages that removal authority but pairs it with direct payments to receiving states—an unusual and controversial tactic—while keeping many operational details secret.
Critics say third-country deportations risk violating non-refoulement principles, which prohibit sending people to places where they face persecution or torture, or where they could be passed on to such harm (so-called chain refoulement). Advocacy groups have flagged prior Eswatini returns of people from Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Yemen. It has been reported that at least one Cambodian deportee may be repatriated to his home country, and another person was previously sent to Jamaica, underscoring the fluidity—and opacity—of post-removal custody and onward transfers.
What this means for people facing removal now
For individuals with final removal orders whose home countries will not accept them—or where logistics have stalled—DHS may pursue transfer to a third country that agrees to take them. If DHS designates a country where a person fears harm, they can request a “reasonable fear” interview and seek withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). These protections are narrower than asylum and move quickly, so accessing counsel is critical. People can also seek a stay of removal from ICE ERO (Enforcement and Removal Operations) or ask courts or the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen cases, but success rates are limited and timelines compressed.
Lawyers should watch for sudden travel document issuance, detention transfers, and charter flight scheduling—signals a third-country removal is imminent. For affected nationals from conflict-affected regions (such as Somalia or Sudan), documenting risk of torture or ill-treatment in the proposed receiving country—not just the home country—may be decisive. Given the reported use of confidential bilateral deals and high per-person costs, expect continued litigation and congressional oversight over due process, human rights vetting, and spending controls.
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